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Desectarianization: Looking beyond the sectarianization of Middle 
Eastern Politics  
 
 
In recent years, the Middle East has been the site of contestation amidst the often violent 
fragmentation of political organisation. Myriad efforts have been undertaken to understand the 
reasons for this fragmentation which has often been reduced to a consequence of “ancient 
hatreds” that pits Sunni against Shi’a. One of the more compelling arguments to understand the 
emergence of sectarian violence was proposed by Nader Hashemi and Danny Postel who suggest 
that the politics of the Middle East has undergone a process of sectarianization. This article builds 
upon the work of Hashemi and Postel to consider potential mechanisms to challenge this process 
of sectarianization, to work towards desectarianization. With this in mind, I propose an approach 
that borrows from a number of different disciplines to create for a four-stage framework to 
facilitate desectarianization. In support of this, I draw upon interviews conducted with clerics, 
policy makers and journalists across the Middle East, along with interviews from my time as 




In recent years, the Middle East has been the site of contestation amidst the often violent 
fragmentation of political organisation. Myriad efforts have been undertaken to understand 
the reasons for this fragmentation which has often been reduced to a consequence of 
“ancient hatreds” that pits Sunni against Shi’a. Advocates of such a position hold that as the 
sovereign order becomes contested, actors become bearers of sectarian identities over all 
others. It is hardly surprising that this position has come in for a great deal of criticism from 
scholars who view it as Orientalist, simplistic and fundamentally inaccurate. Other positions 
hold that sectarian difference has been used instrumentally as a mechanism of control (See: 
Wehrey, 2014; Potter, 2014; Matthiesen, 2013; Haddad, 2013). An increasingly prominent 
feature of these calculations, however, is the location of sectarianism within the context of a 
broader geopolitical struggle (Mabon, 2013).  
 
One of the more compelling arguments to understand the emergence of sectarian violence 
was proposed by Nader Hashemi and Danny Postel who suggest that the politics of the Middle 
East has undergone a process of sectarianization (2017). The sectarianization thesis has 
gained a great deal of traction in discussions of the region, given its capacity to explain the 
rise of sect-based violence in particular times and spaces. In spite of its popularity, very little 
work has been undertaken that seeks to move towards a desectarianization of regional 
politics. A key component of the sectarianization thesis is that sect-based enmity is moulded 
and mobilized as a consequence of political factors which, if we accept this premise, suggests 
that strategies can be put in place to reduce tensions. A range of approaches have been 
deployed in an attempt to bring peace to divided societies, predominantly either through 
cultivating political systems with representation from all sides, or through reconciliation 
efforts. Yet what becomes increasingly problematic for our inquiry is the regional nature of 
sectarianization.  
 
The desectarianization of politics across the region is certainly a long-term project, possibly 
requiring generations. Yet it is a process that must be draw upon and learn lessons from other 
peace building projects. This article builds upon the work of Hashemi and Postel to consider 
potential mechanisms to challenge this process of sectarianization, to work towards 
desectarianization. With this in mind, I propose an approach that creates a four-stage 
framework to facilitate desectarianization. First, I offer an account of the sectarianization 
thesis put forward by Hashemi and Postel. Second, I consider the importance of geopolitical 
factors in facilitating sectarianization, focussing upon the rivalry between Saudi Arabia and 
Iran. Third, I explore the sectarianization of regional politics. Fourth, I look at peace building 
approaches that seek to end conflict in divided societies before articulating a process of 
desectarianization. In support of this, I draw upon interviews conducted with clerics, policy 
makers and journalists across the Middle East, along with interviews from my time as 
specialist advisor to the House of Lords Committee Inquiry into British relations with the 
Middle East.  
 
The Sectarianization Thesis 
 
Central to the sectarianization project is an attempt to understand why, at this particular 
moment in time, did conflict between sectarian groups break out. The very idea of 
sectarianism suggests a static, trans-historical force that is both enduring and immutable, a 
characteristic found in the Arab and Islamic world from the 7th century until today. To answer 
this question, Nader Hashemi and Danny Postel suggest that we should consider the 
sectarianization of regional politics. For Hashemi and Postel, sectarianization is “an active 
process shaped by political actors operating within specific contexts, pursuing political goals 
that involve the mobilization of popular sentiments around particular identity markers. Class 
dynamic, fragile states, and geopolitical rivalries also shape the sectarianization” (2017, 3). In 
recent decades, it is this sect based difference rather than regime type has become the central 
cleavage of regional politics.  
 
This thesis is supported by Vali Nasr, who argues that the nature of politics changed in the 
aftermath of the US led invasion of Iraq, meaning that modernity, fundamentalism, 
nationalism and democracy failed to explain the complexities of the region. Instead, “the old 
feud” between Sunni and Shi’a was the defining feature of political, social and economic life 
(Nasr, 2007). Acknowledging Nasr’s claim, Hashemi and Postel raise three questions: why 
now? How can we understand the upsurge in sect-based conflict in particular times and 
places? And how can the phenomena be understood? It is in attempt to answer these 
questions that the concept of sectarianization is proposed. To understand sectarianization we 
must explore political life and the spatial dynamics that create the conditions to allow for such 
processes. And as Hashemi and Postel acknowledge in The New York Times, to stop the spike 
in tensions between Sunni and Shi’a and prevent sectarian difference becoming a self-
perpetuating reality, we must understand the forces driving the conflict internally along with 
the rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran which occupies a central role (Hashemi and Postel, 
2018).  
A prominent part of the sectarianization thesis is the cultivation of group identities, an ‘in-
group’ closed off against an ‘out-group’ (Mabon, 2020). From this closing off, identities are 
mobilized by actors seeking to propagate particular agendas. Hashemi and Postel draw 
parallels with ethnic and religious mobiliziation, correctly asserting that “most mainstream 
forms of political Islam are in effect religious forms of nationalism: their proponents have 
accepted the borders of the post-colonial state and are fundamentally concerned with 
changing the internal politics of their home countries” (Hashemi and Postel, 2017: 3). Such a 
thesis is supported by Madawi Al Rasheed and others who refer to “sectarian entrepreneurs”, 
those who seek to manipulate identities for their own ends. It is not “an inherent historical 
quality of the Arab masses” (Al Rasheed, 2017: 158; Matthiesen, 2017). As Geneive Abdo 
argues, sectarian entrepreneurs engage in a rewriting of the “history of the present”, where 
memory and tradition are shaped by the context and contingency of local and regional 
factors, with implications for the ordering of space (Abdo, 2017: 10). 
Within traditional approaches to understanding the mobilization of identities, three schools 
of thought are dominant. The first, primordialism, holds that identities are deeply embedded 
within human relations and psychology, based on a set of intangible elements grounded in 
biology, history and tradition. The second is the instrumentalist view, which holds that 
identity is malleable, a key part of political processes. The malleable nature of identity leaves 
it open to manipulation, a tool in the arsenal of actors seeking to advance their own political, 
social and economic interests as entrepreneurs.  The third approach is constructivism, a 
middle-ground view between the two that suggests identity is not fixed but is a construct 
from social relationships stemming from modernity. The constructivist shares the sense of 
immutable features of identity, yet reject that it has to lead to conflict, whilst agreeing with 
the instrumentalists that entrepreneurs play a key role in mobilizing.  
Holding a constructivist view, Hashemi and Postel argue that sectarianization occurs as a 
consequence of the manipulation of social and political dynamics by authoritarian regimes 
and sectarian entrepreneurs. Authoritarianism occupies a central role in the thesis, with a 
corrosive legacy that has “deeply sullied” the political organisation and social construction of 
the region. As Hashemi and Postel suggest, it is authoritarianism and not theology that is a 
critical factor in the emergence of sectarian difference. This view suggests that sect-based 
identities are manipulated by in an attempt to increase legitimacy and maintain power amidst 
serious demands for political change. As a consequence, understanding the political and 
socio-economic context is central to understanding how – and why – sectarianization has 
found traction. States and the regimes that run them thus play a key role within securitization 
processes.  
This idea evokes the work of Joel Migdal, whose strong societies, weak states thesis certainly 
adds value to this position. For Migdal, the idea of a weak state is one unable to enforce key 
governance structures, to “penetrate society, regulate social relationships, extract resources, 
and appropriate or use resources in determined ways”, where social forces stymie efforts at 
exerting authority (1998 :4).1 Central to Migdal’s argument is the idea that regimes and 
societies compete over social control and the practices and norms that regulate life, shaping 
each other in the process. Amidst serious challenges to political stability and competition over 
myriad resources, political life becomes contested, open to the manipulation of identity 
groups in pursuit of political or economic goals by sectarian entrepreneurs.  
Processes of sectarianization refer to the cultivation and manipulation of seemingly violent 
divisions between – and within – groups by individuals with a vested interest in communal 
                                                     
1 Whilst some may draw parallels with ideas of hybrid sovereignty, such a concept struggles to 
adequately take into account the interaction of formal and informal structures, particularly the 
implications of such a struggle for space and the regulation of life. 
supremacy. Through such approaches, sectarian difference becomes a vehicle through which 
subjectivity, prejudice and politics gain traction; it is when sectarian language gains or 
becomes loaded with political meaning, allowing difference takes on an antagonistic form. 
With this added meaning, grievances develop, and as political structures are put in place to 
regulate life, such sentiments become both institutionalised and generational. As we have 
seen in Lebanon, Iraq, Israel, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Iran (amongst others), processes of state 
formation have regularly created antagonistic grievances between sectarian groups as a 
means of maintaining control and ultimately, survival (Hashemi and Postel, 2017).  
 
The prominence of religion within the fabric of states across the region serves as a means of 
increasing legitimacy and also of locating actions within broader narratives, both theological 
and geopolitical. In times of uncertainty, identities also serve as a means of ensuring survival. 
As one observer suggested, “it is a way of saying I am less likely to be killed by this person 
than if I align with that person”.2 The prominence of Islam within political organisation 
provides means for elites to use religious discourse in pursuit of their own ends, a means to 
“to mobilise and manipulate their people”.3 Yet with religion occupying a central role within 
the fabric of political organisation, regional events have the capacity to shape local contexts 
and vice versa. Whilst the motivations of local and regional actors who adhere to the same 
sect may coalesce, they may not always have the same objectives.4 In conflict zones, some 
suggest that local groups capitalize on the involvement of regional powers, moulding their 
identities according to the perceived wishes of external actors in search of funding, although 
this suggests a transient and instrumentalised view of identity. (Phillips and Valbjørn, 2018). 
 
In divided societies where sectarian divisions have taken on political, social and economic 
meaning, sectarian identities risk becoming all encompassing, providing elites with the means 
of maintaining control and increasing legitimacy amidst increasing contestation, both 
domestically and regionally. Sect-based identities offer a form of protection amidst an 
increasingly precarious situations. As sectarian difference takes on additional meaning, it risks 
becoming all encompassing, a self-fulfilling prophecy that consumes all in its way.5 As 
Hashemi and Postel have demonstrated, this process takes place within the context of 
rampant authoritarianism and a crisis of legitimacy. At such a time, the designation of an out 
group as an existential threat, capitalizing upon broader geopolitical trends and speaking to 
an audience comprised of both domestic and regional constituents comprises the 
sectarianization process.   
The Geopolitics of Sectarianism  
 
As Michael Barnett argued, at times of crisis regimes have opportunities to reshape regional 
politics (1998). Using the power of the Pan Arab frame, regimes sought to increase their 
influence across the region through demonstrating their adherence to the norms of the 
movement. In later years, similar performances would occur using Islamic rhetoric. More 
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3 Testimony, Al Khoei.  
4 Testimony, Haid.  
5 This point was made by several interviewees from Lebanon. Similar issues also appear in Syria and 
Iraq.   
recently, sectarian narratives, predominantly couched in anti-Iranian terms, have become 
increasingly common as a means of demonstrating and securing a regime’s position in the 
regional order (Malmvig, 2014: 146). In the context of recent events – and sectarianization -  
the rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran provides the conditions for speech acts to take root 
across the Middle East and beyond, capitalizing on immutably different identities which 
derive legitimacy from religion. 
 
Geopolitical tensions have long had a domestic impact, historically seen in the Arab 
nationalist cause but more recently seen in the sectarianization of regional politics. From this, 
it is easy to see how distinct events lead to an increase in tensions, such as after the  Iran-Iraq 
war, the 2003 Iraq war, and the 2011 Arab Uprisings. In the aftermath of each of these events 
there was a spike in sect-based violence, underpinned by the rivalry between Saudi Arabia 
and Iran. Although couched in sectarian terms, the rivalry is essentially geopolitical and one 
that uses Islam as a means of mobilizing support across the region (Mabon, 2013; Rubin, 
2014). Closer exploration of the rivalry supports the view, as the period between 1990 and 
2003 was one marked by a burgeoning rapprochement. In the aftermath of the Arab 
Uprisings, the rivalry between Riyadh and Tehran has continued to play a dominant role in 
regional politics, manifesting in the domestic actions of a number of actors through the 
securitization of Shi’a groups and, fundamentally, the sectarianization of regional politics. As 
Hashemi and Postel opine, “Saudi accusations of Iran orchestrating a serpentine Shiite 
takeover of the Arab world are self-serving exaggerations that conveniently cloak Riyadh’s 
own malfeasance, yet Iran’s policies in Syria make these claims sound perfectly plausible to 
many Sunnis” (2018). 
 
Whilst sectarian difference underpinned by geopolitical intent has seemingly created 
intractable conflict between Riyadh and Tehran, it was not always thus. In the early aftermath 
of the 1979 revolution in Iran, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the architect of the Islamic 
Republic, stressed that 
 
There is no difference between Muslims who speak different languages, for instance the Arabs 
and the Persians. It is very probable that such problems have been created by those who do 
not wish the Muslim countries to be united [. . .] They create the issues of nationalism, of pan-
Iranianism, pan-Turkism, and such isms, which are contrary to Islamic doctrines. (Cited in 
Amirahmadi and Entessar, 1993:3). 
 
Yet shortly after, as relations with Saudi Arabia became increasingly fractious, the rhetoric 
from Tehran took on a more hostile dimension, as Khomeini expressed a desire to   
 
export our experiences to the whole world and present the outcome of our struggles against 
tyrants to those who are struggling along the path of God, without expecting the slightest 
reward. The result of this exportation will certainly result in the blooming of the buds of 
victory and independence and in the implementation of Islamic teachings among the enslaved 
nations (Cited in New York Times, 1987). 
 
In response, the Saudi leadership condemned the “hypocrites and pretenders who are using 
Islam to undermine and destabalise other countries” (Goldberg, 1987: 589). Following this, a 
number of events fuelled the fears of a number of regional players as Iran sought to export 
the revolution. In particular, the establishment of Hizballah, the Lebanese Party of God and 
the failed 1981 coup d’etat in Bahrain undertaken by the Islamic Front for the Liberation of 
Bahrain provoked a great deal of consternation as Iranian forces directly supported the 
establishment of anti-status quo groups across the region. 
 
Following the end of the Iran-Iraq war, relations across the Gulf entered a new phase. The 
death of Khomeini and emergence of seemingly more reform minded politicians in Iran were 
matched by like-minded individuals in Saudi Arabia who appeared open to rapprochement. 
Central to these moves was a devastating earthquake in Iran, to which Saudi Arabia sent aid. 
In the following years, a burgeoning rapprochement took hold, driven by high level 
delegations visiting both states, yet broader geopolitical considerations would ultimately put 
paid to these diplomatic initiatives (Mabon, 2018).  
 
The 2003 invasion of Iraq occupies a central role within the escalation of geopolitical tensions. 
Whilst both Saudi Arabia and Iran expressed grave fears about the behaviour of the Ba’ath 
regime in Iraq, the toppling of Saddam Hussein created a new arena of regional competition 
and a bi-polar region.  For the former Iraqi Prime Minister, Nouri Al Maliki, the idea of 
decentralisation was a “hidden plot”, part of an agenda to divide the country.  For others, 
appealing to divisions within divided societies would “open Pandora’s box”, creating “a race 
to the bottom in each individual canton [over] who is more Sunni, who is more Shia who is 
more Kurdish”.6 Yet for Saudi King Abdullah, Nori Al Maliki was “an Iranian agent” who had 
opened the door for Iranian influence in Iraq” since taking power (09RIYADH447_a 2009). 
 
In recent years, the concept of the Shi’a Crescent has created an image of a region increasingly 
divided along sectarian lines, albeit a concept that is seemingly only used in the English 
language. Speaking with The Washington Post, King Abdullah of Jordan argued that 
If pro-Iran parties or politicians dominate the new Iraqi government […] a new “crescent” of 
dominant Shiite movements or governments stretching from Iran into Iraq, Syria and Lebanon 
could emerge, alter the traditional balance of power between the two main Islamic sects and 
pose new challenges to U.S. interests and allies […]. It would be a major problem. And then 
that would propel the possibility of a Shiite-Sunni conflict even more, as you’re taking it out 
of the borders of Iraq (Wright and Baker, 2004). 
Abdullah’s remarks were echoed by regimes across the region, particularly in the Gulf, driven 
by fears about pernicious Iranian behaviour and the loyalties of their own Shi’a populations.  
 
Speech acts from prominent officials across the Gulf reflect such concerns. In US diplomatic 
cables released by Wikileaks, Saudi fears about Iranian actions in Iraq are well documented. 
In one cable, US officials were urged not to “leave Iraq until its sovereignty has been restored, 
otherwise it will be vulnerable to the Iranians’” (06RIYADH9175_a, 2006). Abdullah also called 
on the US to “cut off the head of the snake”, citing a desire to work with the US to “roll back 
Iranian influence in Iraq” (08RIYADH649_a, 2008). Similar views were held by key Saudi allies 
across the region. In neighbouring Bahrain, many in the Al Khalifa believe that “as long as 
Khamenei has the title of Commander-in-Chief, Bahrain must worry about the loyalty of Shia 
who maintain ties and allegiance to Iran” (06MANAMA409_a, 2006). 
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For the Saudi Foreign Minister Adel Al Jubeir, Iran sought to “obscure its dangerous sectarian 
and expansionist policies, as well as its support for terrorism, by leveling unsubstantiated 
charges against the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia” (2016). Al Jubeir also argued that Iran is “the 
single-most-belligerent-actor in the region, and its actions display both a commitment to 
regional hegemony and a deeply held view that conciliatory gestures signal weakness either 
on Iran’s part or on the part of its adversaries” (2016). These views were echoed by Saudi 
allies across the region. A prominent Bahraini official, Fawaz bin Mohammad Al Khalifa, 
condemned the “expansionist ambitions of the Persian Shia establishment”, blaming Iran for 
continued unrest divided societies (Al Khalifa, 2016), documented in diplomatic cables 
released by the Wikileaks organization.  
The Sectarianization of Regional Politics 
 
The events of the Arab Uprisings fuelled the concerns of regimes across the region. As 
protesters took to the streets demanding greater political rights and an improvement in socio-
economic conditions, authoritarian regimes struggled to assert control and maintain 
legitimacy. Myriad strategies were used by regimes to ensure their survival. One such 
approach was to cultivate a narrative that suggested protest and expression of political 
aspirations was a path to civil war akin to that seen in Syria, Iraq and Yemen. Thus, when 
combined with the sectarianization of political life, democratic and normative desires were 
renounced by many in favour of stability and security.7  
 
In a struggle for power, competing historiographies and interpretations of culture emerged. 
Nationalist narratives became contested, taking on new meaning as entrepreneurs and 
protesters gave new meaning to poetry, narratives and music that had previously been by 
regimes as mechanisms of control. 8 One immediate consequence was that all events took on 
a sectarian slant, perhaps best summed up by an elderly businessman in Bahrain who asserted 
that “the Persians are everywhere”.9 The impact of regional fears on domestic politics is 
perhaps best seen in Bahrain which, for Toby Matthiesen, is the “most salient” example of 
the sectarianization process, as domestic political issues fall within broader geopolitical 
struggles (2017).  
 
Acknowledging the potential challenges stemming from divisions, regimes deployed a range 
of strategies in an attempt to ensure their survival. Political fragmentation created space for 
a range of groups and factions to act in pursuit of their – often competing – agendas, existing 
within the territorial shell of the sovereign state.10 A key part of this was the mobilization of 
often violent identities to justify repression of opposition groups, as seen in Syria where Assad 
framed his actions as part of a broader ‘war on terror’ against Al Qa’ida affiliated 
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9 Interview with British embassy official, Manama, 2014. 
10 One example of this concerns the emergence of strong factions within the army which had been 
created by Saleh in an attempt to silo the institution and to maintain loyalty in times of crisis. Amidst 
rapid escalation factions in the military cultivated alliances with tribal groups in pursuit of their own 
economic interests. This interaction reveals both the complexity of civil-military relations, but also 
suggests that the very structure of the military that Saleh had created to ensure his survival would 
work against him. For a more detailed discussion (See Knights: 2013)  
organisations. 11 Similar events have taken place across the region. In Bahrain, the Al Khalifa 
capitalized on sectarian difference to solidify their rule in the face of popular protests in 2011. 
In Yemen, tribal leaders sought to capitalise on this contestation as a means of challenging 
and circumventing the legacy and influence of the sayyid, feeding into the fracturing of the 
Shi’a community (Philbrick Yadav, 2017: 188).  
 
As political life became imbued with sectarian characteristics through sectarianization it also 
took on geopolitical importance. When groups were framed along sectarian lines, they 
became seen as the existential other. In doing this, regimes strengthened their support bases 
internally and externally, locating their struggle within the context of broader geopolitical 
struggles.12 Amidst uncertainty, local groups are often located as passive actors within 
regional currents, shaping their identities according to the perceived wishes of external 
groups in support of financial reward or ideological vision, albeit evoking somewhat 
instrumentalised and transient view of identity (Phillips and Valbjørn, 2018).  
 
For a large number of Sunni Arabs across the Gulf, Iranian activity is the source of instability 
as a consequence of the increasing politicisation and securitization of the region.13 Such a 
view is a direct consequence of the actions of a number of regimes, not least of all Saudi 
Arabia, whose response to the Arab Uprisings has been to marginalize Shi’a groups and, by 
extension Iran, facilitating the broader sectarianization of regional politics (Matthiesen, 2014; 
Al Rasheed, 2017). The new Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia, Mohammad bin Salman, accused 
Iran of “direct military aggression”, suggesting that these actions “may be considered an act 
of war against the Kingdom” (Dehghan, 2017). 
 
Fears of Iranian intervention were a source of great consternation. As Adel Al Jubeir argued, 
“Iranian interventions in the region are detrimental to the security of neighbouring countries 
and affect international peace and security. We will not allow any infringement of our 
national security” (Wahab, 2017). Moreover, for Al Jubeir, “Iran’s role and its direct command 
of its Houthi proxy in this matter constitute a clear act of aggression that targets neighbouring 
countries, and threatens peace and security in the region and globally” (Wahab, 2017). 
Rejecting such claims, Javad Zarif – Al Jubeir’s Iranian counterpart – claimed that “Iranian 
‘aggression’ is a myth, easily perpetuated by those willing to spend their dollars on American 
military equipment and public-relations firms, and by those promising to protect American 
interest rather than those of their own people” (2017). A direct consequence of this increase 
in geopolitical tensions is change in the way in which Shi’a groups are viewed and framed. As 
Fanar Haddad argues, “Shiites who used to be accused of ethnic otherness are now being cast 
as outside the Muslim community itself. Exclusion on doctrinal grounds was a mostly Saudi 
exception in the framing of Shiism. It is now increasingly becoming the regional rule” (Haddad, 
2013).  
 
In places such as Lebanon, as sect-based identities became embedded within the political 
fabric of the state’s power sharing agreement, religious difference risks becoming all 
encompassing. The neopatrimonial political system means that political elites maintained 
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strong relationships with their business counterparts. As a consequence, sectarian identities 
provide business elites – both legitimate and mafias – with the mechanisms to increase their 
profit margins and political elites with mechanisms of control. This quickly became an 
existential issue, not because of sectarian difference itself, but because of the political and 
economic manifestations of this difference within the state. Groups swiftly positioned 
themselves along sectarian lines, benefitting from division and capitalising on societal 
differences. As conflict escalated in Iraq, Syria and Yemen, groups in conflict zones began to 
frame themselves along sectarian lines, mobilizing others as a consequence and transforming 
societal identities.  
 
Yet sect-based difference need not necessarily lead to violence and consideration of political 
life across the region is testament to such a claim. Whilst we must not ignore the tensions 
between sectarian identities which often erupt in violence, there are a number of examples 
of how this is not a necessary outcome. In Kuwait, strong communal identities have existed 
and operated alongside one another, albeit within the context of political contestation that 
has occurred in other forms. Across political life in Kuwait, Shi’a political groups occupied a 
prominent role in the political system alongside their Sunni counterparts, serving as a bulwark 
against other opposition groups, embedding the spirit of compromise at the heart of Kuwaiti 
politics, albeit conspicuously absent in the treatment of the country’s bidoon population 
(Wells, 2017). Cross-sectarian unity has been a prominent feature of Kuwaiti society, perhaps 
best seen in response to an attack on Shi’a worshipers at the al-Imam as-Sadiq Mosque. 
Claims to unity were echoed by a group of diwaniyahs - the Kuwaiti traditional ‘gathering 
lounges – who stressed the Kuwaiti spirit of devotion and togetherness (KUNA, 2015), whilst 
the Emir also expressed unison, demonstrating that sectarian difference need not necessarily 
lead to violence. From this it is easy to see how the sectarianization thesis offers a convincing 
account of the descent into what appears to be protracted social conflicts. Yet accepting the 
constructed nature of events suggests that they can also be deconstructed, that the 
sectarianized can be desectarianized.  
Desectarianization  
 
As we have seen, sectarianization is a consequence of entrepreneurial actions that facilitate 
the politicized construction of communal difference. Precisely because of the social 
construction of sectarianization, it can be deconstructed. The final part of this paper proposes 
an approach that will facilitate a desectarianization of the contemporary Middle East. 
Desectarianization seeks to reverse the process of sectarianization and reducing geopolitical 
tensions that have played such a damaging role in shaping the politics of the region. The 
complexity of the challenge requires a multifaceted approach that engages with challenges 
locally, nationally and internationally. As sectarianization is comprised of moves that 
capitalize upon domestic and regional political conditions and empower communities, 
desectarianization must address political conditions that facilitate sectarianization and 
prevent the framing of identity groups as existential threats.  Building on recommendations 
from in a European Parliament report, four areas are deemed essential to the 
desectarianization of regional politics (Matthiesen [ed], 2016). 
 
Facilitate conflict transformation 
 
The first step in desectarianization efforts is to expedite conflict resolution and 
transformation (where necessary), deploying peace-building approaches amongst those 
communities beset by violence. Whilst this should occur at elite level, it must also include 
grassroots transformation and peace-building efforts. It should be underpinned by an effort 
to foster inclusion and to eradicate social inequality, working towards more responsible 
resource and asset management, discussed in more detail below.  
 
The success of peace processes in Northern Ireland, Cyprus and the Balkans reveal a number 
of lessons for those wishing to work towards a desectarianization of the Middle East. 
Northern Ireland provides an example of a negotiated form of power sharing, underpinned 
by de-commissioning processes, structural economic changes, measures to address social 
inequality and reform to the police service (Cochrane, 2013). A key component of such 
approaches is the involvement of regional actors who supported the process, along with the 
monitoring of events by international organisations such as the United Nations. Central to 
this is the (re)building of infrastructure necessary to ending humanitarian crises. This should 
be done in a politically neutral way and ensure the provision of physical and mental 
healthcare.  
 
Support the rule of law and good governance 
 
Political fragmentation and transition have creation conditions of socio-economic instability  
which has had a devastating impact upon political life. Displacement stemming from conflict 
comes with its own issues for those directly affected, but beyond this, the prevalence of 
authoritarianism and ensuing crisis of legitimacy has created conditions that facilitate the 
proliferation of sectarianization. Fundamental to the process is a move away from 
authoritarian politics that requires regimes to undertake coup proofing strategies and to 
frame sect-based identities as a threat to maintain their power. If we accept the premise put 
forward by Hashemi and Postel that sectarianization occurs within the context of 
authoritarian political structures, then we must consider how political structures have 
facilitated the emergence of sectarianization within the public sphere.   
 
The emergence of conflict and instability across the Middle East typically is a consequence of 
the weakness of state institutions and the erosion of claims to sovereign power more broadly 
(Mabon, 2017). The 2016 Arab Human Development report stated that “the events of 2011 
and their ramifications are the outcome of public policies over many decades that gradually 
led to the exclusion of large sectors of the population from economic, political and social life” 
(UN, 2016: 17).  According to the Doha Institute’s Arab Opinion Index, by 2011 and the time 
of the Arab Uprisings, 41% of people in the region were living in need whilst 53% required 
financial assistance from beyond the state. Such conditions continued over the following 
years, creating conditions rife for the existence of clientelist systems. Whilst economic, 
political and security conditions have improved, by 2018 55% of respondents had negative 
views of their home country’s political situation (Arab Opinion Index, 2017). Corruption is 
seen to be rife, with 91% of respondents of a 2018 survey believing that corruption was 
“widespread” in their home country (Arab Opinion Index, 2017). A UN report suggested that 
in the past 50 years, endemic corruption has been estimated in the region of USD 1 trillion 
(United Nations, 2016: 19). 
 
Population increases of around 53% between 1991 and 2010 have increased this instability 
(International Labour Organization, 2012: 47), whilst economic inefficiency means that public 
sectors are unable to provide jobs. Amidst precarious socio-economic conditions, the 
sectarianization of political life comes at a devastating cost, deepening schisms between and 
within societies. The manipulation of socio-economic factors are fundamental in the 
cultivation of division, as prominent business leaders nurture difference as a mechanism of 
ensuring support from their constituencies, whilst also benefitting from divisions financially.14 
Thus, to reduce political divisions to a theological base wilfully ignores how divisions are being 
manipulated to suit the needs of a wealthy few.  
 
Build trust in political systems and recognising individual rights 
 
Political systems serve as a key tool in efforts to facilitate peace and building trust.  As John 
McGarry and Brendan O’Leary acknowledge, the regulation or management of conflict in 
divided societies is deeply problematic, but political systems can provide an answer, albeit 
contingent upon having the trust of the body politic (1993:4). For many, the best approach to 
building peace in a divided society is consociationalism, a power sharing system of 
government that seeks to accommodate the plurality of society by guaranteeing political 
representation to adversarial ethnic groups (Lijphart, 1998). Initially proposed by Arend 
Lijphart, it is an approach designed to facilitate resolution through accommodating elites from 
salient segments of society which are then encouraged to build coalitions, protected by 
constitutional vetoes (1977).   
 
Central to the idea of conscociationalism is the thought that a zero-sum game will be 
transformed into one characterised by co-operation and compromise, ultimately translating 
into the softening of communal differences (Kerr, 2005; McGarry and O’Leary, 2007). A 
vibrant scholarly debate exists as to whether “consociational institutions offer a viable 
strategy to build peace, states and democracy” (Wolff, 2011: 1796) or if such an approach 
aggravates “the malady it is allegedly designed to treat” (Shapiro, 1996: 102).  Whilst power 
sharing is a common feature of post conflict reconciliation processes, those who reject its 
value label it as inept, a process that divides rather than encourages and develops a common 
civic identity (Horowitz, 1985).  
 
Two examples of consociational systems in operation across the Middle East can be seen in 
Lebanon and Iraq. Power sharing agreements in Lebanon have been subject of serious 
criticism for creating institutions operating in a dysfunctional manner (Salloukh et al, 2015), 
which entrench antagonistic divisions whilst also facilitating corruption and 
neopatrimonialism (Haddad, 2009). Lijphart himself argued that Lebanon is fundamentally 
discriminatory against “individuals or groups who reject the premise that society should be 
organized on an ethnic or communal basis” (1998: 147). Moreover, minority groups are often 
missed out of power sharing agreements (Nagle, 2018).  
 
In contrast with Lebanon, Iraq’s power sharing agreement became a defining feature of 
political life with the emergence of a new leadership elite in 2004 (Dodge, 2006; Tripp, 2004). 
Sectarian politics in Iraq became institutionalised through a quota system – known as 
                                                     
14 This point was made in interviews across Lebanon, Bahrain, and Iraq.  
muhassasa – that provided space and representation for all of the state’s ethnic-sectarian 
identities. Amidst political uncertainty and instability, muhassasa divided resources and 
ministries along communal lines, embedding clientelism within the system, allowing elites 
from all communities to amass opulent wealth. Whilst muhassasa was designed in the spirit 
of power sharing, it embedded ethno-sectarian identities within the fabric of the state with 
myriad political, economic and security challenges. As a consequence, sectarian narratives 
became increasingly prominent, supported by the emergence of paramilitaries and other 
armed groups also falling along ethno-sectarian lines.  
 
In such conditions, it is hardly surprising that there is little confidence in formal institutions 
and a lack of support for legislatures across the region. Beyond this, there is a general lack of 
confidence in state institutions. In 2015 only 25% believed that the rule of law was applied 
universally whilst 50% of people viewed political situations and economic circumstances 
negatively (Doha Institute, 2014 and 2015). By 2018, 48% of Arab publics evaluate the 
performance of legislatures negatively, whilst in contrast, the army and security sectors were 
viewed favourably. Addressing such concerns is paramount if trust in political structures is to 
be cultivated. 
 
Power-sharing agreements enshrine difference within the fabric of the state, serving to 
reinforce identities formally but also through clientelism and the provision of security amidst 
a lack of trust in political structures. As a consequence, it is imperative that policy makers 
work towards building trust in political systems along with recognising individual rights 
instead of communal rights as a way of circumventing the descent into ethno-sectarian 
violence. This move, a key part of political reform, will ensure that individuals receive 
protection under the rule of law instead of along communal lines. It can also go some way 
into restoring faith in the institutions of state.   
 
In spite of the prominence of sect-based violence and the sectarianization of regional politics, 
there are reasons to be optimistic. Whilst many have been – and continue to be - critical of 
the consociation system of government in Lebanon, this has maintained peace in a country 
previously beset by civil war. In Iraq, the summer of 2018 suggested that cross-sectarian unity 
can be reached, albeit contingent upon favourable conditions and trust in political elites. The 
move from confessional to non-confessional outcomes is one that cannot and should not be 
hurried. Although the latter is almost certainly the desirable end goal in preventing a future 
outbreak of communal violence, the transition from one to the other is complex and requires 
a period of consolidation. Although sectarianization processes risk consuming all in their way, 
there remains scope for agency (Mabon, 2017). During the uprisings in Bahrain, a number of 
people attempted to refuse sect-based labels, claiming that they were “just Bahraini”.15 One 
Bahraini Shi’a cleric told me that “it is an insult to accuse me of following an Iranian agenda 
or being part of an Iranian vision of the region just for being from a Shi’a background”.16 
 
Acknowledge and address the impact of exogenous factors on local dynamics 
 
                                                     
15 Interview with Bahraini student, Manchester (UK), 2014. 
16 Interview with Bahraini Shi’a cleric, Geneva, 2015.  
Perhaps the most dangerous aspect of the sectarianization process is the coming together of 
local agendas with geopolitical rivalries. Here, regional rivalries interact with local actors, 
mobilizing and manipulating difference for their own interests. Whilst we must not deny 
agency to local actors, we should not ignore the power and influence of exogenous forces, 
most prominently seen in the rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran. With both Riyadh and 
Tehran laying claim to Islamic legitimacy which is increasingly seen in ‘zero-sum terms’, the 
rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran has a prominent role in the sectarianization of the 
region and thus, conversely, a reduction in tensions will play a key role in the 
desectarianization of regional politics and conflict in Yemen, Syria and beyond (Mabon, 2013 
and 2018).  
Whilst social projects aimed at creating social cohesion are desirable, these can often only 
occur once a broader peace agreement has been reached. With that in mind, reducing 
tensions between Saudi Arabia and Iran is essential. Although improbable at present, as 
Banafsheh Keynoush has articulated, this is not impossible, seen in the period after the Iran-
Iraq War before the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Whilst many in Saudi Arabia – and beyond – have 
been critical of Iranian actions across the region, Javad Zarif expressed the possibility of 
regional co-operation: 
The co-operative relationships forged in this fight can usher in a new era. We need new 
approaches and new terminology to make sense of a world which is transitioning to a post-
western global order. Here are two concepts to shape the emerging paradigm in west Asia: 
the idea of a strong region, and security networking, whereby small and large countries — 
even those with historical rivalries — contribute to stability (2018). 
Trust building between the two long-standing rivals is essential but as Keynoush rightly points 
out, there are many similarities between the two, which suggests that there is the possibility 
of a more positive relationship between the two states (Keynoush, 2016). 
Conclusion 
 
History has shown that peace building is a long, arduous and difficult process, often beset by 
spoilers and a hostage to fortune. There is no quick fix to the problem of sectarianization in 
the contemporary Middle East; to assume otherwise is dangerous. Although rejecting the 
“ancient hatreds” thesis, the desectarianization of political life may take generations. Indeed, 
in Lebanon, peace building processes have required – and continue to require – time to 
facilitate lasting change. Whilst the civil war is long over, the process of building a lasting 
peace is far more complex, manifesting in socio-economic inequality and a seemingly 
stagnant political system. There is no one size fits all approach to peace building. Whilst a 
framework for desectarianizing the Middle East may appear to do this, the contingency of 
different spaces requires a nuanced approach that appreciates the complexities of local 
problems and is able to adapt accordingly.  
 
it is clear that sectarianization efforts are fabricated as an existential threat, increasingly built 
into the fabric of political organisation across the Middle East as a tool of repression and 
ultimately survival. Yet the complexity of sectarianization processes that has embedded local 
struggles within broader geopolitical rivalries challenges the utility of traditional power 
sharing and peace building approaches. Whilst certainly difficult, the stakes are high and the 
potential benefits of such an approach are easy to see. Working towards a decrease in 
geopolitical tensions, particularly within the context of the rivalry between Saudi Arabia and 
Iran. Once again, this is not a rivalry based on intractable hatred of the other, but contingent 
upon political context. As the period between the Gulf War and the 2003 invasion of Iraq 
shows, there is scope for building peace between the two states. Rejecting myths at a local 
level requires working with grassroots organisations to transform perceptions of the other. 
 
Although relations between Riyadh and Tehran appear obdurate, consideration of the rivalry 
between Saudi Arabia and Iran shows periods of apparent rapprochement which challenges 
the argument that the two are embroiled in an intractable conflict. As Keynoush argues, there 
is scope for dialogue and reform (2016), yet this will require resolving tensions at both a 
regional and domestic level, moving beyond sectarian identities and engaging with people 
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